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Abstract 
Will aid given to specific sector promote growth? Will bilateral aid 
be more effective than multilateral aid in export promotion? This paper fills a 
gap in the literature by studying the implications of aid channeled 
specifically to trade and export oriented growth. Many African Countries 
look towards increase in trade driven growth as a means of improving living 
standards and boosting growth of their economies. Aid given to trade in 
desperately poor countries can be of tremendous advantage to such countries. 
We investigate some peculiar components of temporal self limiting aid (often 
referred to as development assistance) to sectors that can affect trade in 
developing countries. Aid to four sectors was found to have significant 
impact on trade although the presence of natural resources tends to reduce 
the effectiveness of aid in promoting trade. Institutions and government 
economic policies were also found to be weak in the African countries in our 
sample reducing aid overall effect on trade. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The International Trade Centre (ITC) taskforce report 2010/13 states 
that global markets and export oriented growth are an effective way of 
alleviating poverty, improving livelihood and supporting entrepreneurship in 
a sustainable way.  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Gap 
taskforce report 2010 have also confirmed that “trade is a useful mechanism 
to realize the MDGs by the 2015 deadline” therefore trade is vital in driving 
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growth. Studying aid-trade dynamics in this paper13  provides an insight into 
the possible effects that aid can have on trade with particular emphasis on 
Africa.   
  Exports (as a measure of trade) can have a strong effect on the living 
conditions of people in advanced countries where strong trading capabilities 
have already been attained and in developing countries that are emerging 
from economic and political disruptions who wish to establish strong trade 
ties (see ITC Trade Report 2010/2013 and DFID (Department for 
international Development) Strategy Report Working Paper on Economic 
Growth 2008/2013). Exports also has the capability to increase employment, 
improve earning power, raise government revenue to provide more services 
to its population, provide economic empowerment for the poor through 
commerce and deal with environmental and climatic problems, if the gains 
accruing from exports are used for common good (see International Trade 
Centre (ITC) Taskforce Report 2010/13 for details).   
           Africa’s per capita GDP is also significantly low and that is why it 
remains the World poorest continent (see World Bank Statistics 2012). The 
African economy requires a strong industrial effort to drive it out of its 
current economic doldrums. The richest countries in Africa based on World 
Bank 2009 statistics are South Africa and Egypt, (measured by their 
purchasing power parity) with South Africa’s GDP being around $488.6 
billion as of 2009, see Economic Watch “An African Economy Overview” 
(2010), however many African countries remain extremely poor. Foreign aid 
given to these poor countries can have strong effects on the economy of 
these countries (particularly in sub Saharan Africa), especially in 
circumstances where it consist of a significant percentage of their national 
budget or gross domestic product. If the reason behind giving foreign aid is 
purely altruistic, then foreign aid can have a positive impact on the recipient 
country’s development, if well utilized.  
            The aims of this study is to identify what components of foreign aid 
(channeled to trade) is useful in promoting productivity and increasing trade 
in developing countries by dividing aid into sectors, and secondly to 
determine what the impact of government economic policy and institutional 
quality is on aid effectiveness in Africa?  Previous papers have estimated 
reduced forms equations of trade aid dynamics they find that country specific 
economic and social variations and its proximity or distance to both local and 
foreign markets have a significant effect on trade (particularly exports)” see 
Morrissey, Osei and Lloyd (2004).  In this paper it is assumed that aid is 
endogenous. The reason for this is that aid is likely to suffer from 
                                                          
13  I wish to express my thanks to Bergamo University Italy for funding the course of this research and 
for the guidance and feedback obtained in writing this paper. 
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measurement problems since the data for aid might not capture all aid flows 
to developing countries for instance.  
            The econometric approach we use in the study is instrumental 
variable estimation, this allows us to control for endogenity. Aid to sectors 
was found to have little or no significant effect on trade using OLS, and it 
has a somewhat increased effect in sectors using two stage least squares.  
Lots of literatures have argued that aid is useful, while others have suggested 
that giving aid does not help developing countries achieve economic growth. 
Some papers e.g. that of Jempa (1991)14 examine vast literature on foreign 
aid and finds that foreign aid has the tendency to overshadow private 
savings, contribute to consumption spending and has no significant impact 
on a country’s growth. Others like Boone (1994, 1996) find out that aid has 
no effect on investment.  
          Burnside and Dollar (1997) also find that aid is only beneficial to 
countries that have good policies in place. Other authors have found some 
similar inconclusive results regarding aid and growth (see Bourguignon and 
Sundberg, 2008; Douclouliagos and Paldam, 2007).  There is also, 
conflicting evidence that aid may have a positive impact on growth 
(Gormanee et al, 2003; McPherson and Rakowski, 2001). In addition to 
endogeneity, Svensson (2000) finds that disaggregating aid into sectors is a 
more promising route in trying to identify the effects that aid can have on a 
developing country. Clemens et al (2004) uses sectoral aid and finds a 
positive short-run effect on economic growth and that institutional factors 
may impact the effectiveness of aid.  See Renzio (2006) or Jensen (2008) for 
a review of aid literature. The rest of this paper is divided into five parts, the 
theoretical part, data description, some constraints to trade in Africa and 
index construction, empirical analysis and conclusion. 
 
2.0 Theory and Methodology 
  The theoretical model we present suggest that  some specifically 
channeled aid can influence exports, the simple export demand model as 
developed by Fontagne et al (2002)15, used by Morrissey et al (2004) and 
Cali and Velde (2009), shows the possible effect that aid can have on trade. 
If we assume a situation where each country produces one good, 
differentiated from the others as a result of its place of production (origin), 
with the supply of each good constant and consumers having identical and 
homothetic choices which is represented by a constant elasticity of 
                                                          
14  Jempa, C. (1991) suggests that foreign aid in most cases does not contribute in a significant 
manner to a country’s economic growth. 
15  The model first developed by Fontague et al (2002) describes the role of country specific effect particularly 
infrastructure in determining trade cost. We extend this model to the private sector and show how aid will affect 
factors of production  such as cost of capital, labor and cost of developing a suitable environment for trade. 
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substitution (CES) utility function. The overall utility function of individuals 
in a given country k can be defined as a sum of the utility function of 
individuals in country i. we represent this in equation 1 below as  (𝟏. )          𝑼𝒌 = (∑    𝝋𝒊  𝟏𝝈 𝑵𝒊=𝟏 𝑪𝒊𝒌  𝝈−𝟏𝝈       ) 𝝈𝝈−𝟏       
Where 𝜎 = elasticity of substitution of all goods and services, this can be 
defined as the share of goods and services from country i expended upon by 
individuals in country k, 
 C𝑖𝑘  = the value of consumption of the goods produced in country i by 
individuals in country k, φ𝑖 = share of goods produced by country i, 
expended on by individuals in country k,  
where k ϵ [1, N] this subject to the budget constraint that the value of goods 
and services consumed by individuals in country k, needs to be equal to the 
total national income of country k. The income of country K is given as 
shown in equation 2 below as (𝟐. )                𝒚𝒌 = ∑   𝑪𝒊𝒌 𝑷𝒊𝒌  𝑵𝒊=𝟏   
 Where  P𝑖𝑘 =is the price in importer country k of goods produced in 
exporting country i     P𝑖  is expressed as the supply price of the exporter i 
 Then therefore Pik =Pi τik where τik ≥ 1 which is the exporters price times 
the cost of transaction 
This will capture all types of trade related transaction cost for example 
potential tariffs and import taxes, likely administrative cost of trade, , 
transportation to ports and other local and international market destinations 
etc see Cali and Velde (2009) for further discussion.  After maximizing eqn.1 
subject to the budget constraint in eqn. 2 the real consumption  Cik  with 
respect to import of goods from country i by country k is given below as in 
equation 3 below 
  (𝟑. )                  𝐂𝐢𝐤 = 𝝋𝒊 𝒀𝒊  𝝉𝒊 𝑷𝒊 (𝝋𝒊 𝒀𝒊  𝝉𝒊 𝑷𝒊  ) 𝟏−𝝈  
The constant elasticity of substitution can be expressed as the likely 
trade cost in exporting to country k this can be defined as an index of how far 
in terms of distance, that country k is to country i, given by the distance 
factor. The distance factor can be defined as how remote goods from country 
i are from the market of country k. We express it in terms of remoteness in 
eqn. 4  
     (𝟒. )              𝐑𝒊 =(∑    𝛗𝒊  𝛕𝒊  𝟏−𝝈   𝐏𝒊  𝟏−𝝈 𝑵𝒊=𝟏 ) 𝟏𝟏−𝝈  
country’s k income can be expressed as  y𝑘 = P𝑘 Q𝑘 . which is the price 
multiplied by quantity consumed. The total export from country i to country 
k can be given as 
   X𝑖𝑘  expressed below in terms of the exporting price and 
the total consumption in k of country i goods and services. 
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 (5.)   
               𝐗𝒊𝒌 =  𝐂𝒊𝒌 𝐏𝒊  = 𝛗𝒊 𝐘𝒊     𝛕𝒊𝒌  𝝈 (𝐑 𝐏𝒊  ) 𝝈−𝟏  
The total exports from country i can also be expressed as  (𝟔. )                  𝐗𝒊 = 𝛗𝒊     𝐩𝒊  𝝈−𝟏 ∑    𝐘𝒊    𝐑𝒌  𝝈−𝟏   𝛕𝒊𝒌  𝝈  𝑵𝒌=𝟏   
This indicates that exports from country i will depend significantly on 
individual country preferences for goods from i. This will depict how 
competitive, attractive and the degree to which goods from country i are in 
demand in the international market. Total demand from country i therefore, 
will be affected in a negative manner by the cost of carrying out trade 
transaction in i, since this will affect its final selling price. This will therefore 
be displayed by its constant elasticity of substitution σ (CES).  If the  σ =1 
this will mean that the CES is high therefore increases in price of goods from 
country i will lead to a significant decrease in exports since buyers will have 
to look elsewhere for cheaper goods, therefore change in exports with respect 
to price will reduce which we can express as ∂X𝑖    ∂p𝑖  < 0. 
            Incorporating foreign aid into our exports model, it is likely that it 
could influence a whole lot of factors that could lead to increase in exports. 
Some factors that it could influence are the quality of goods produced by a 
country which could lead to product competitiveness in the international 
market this will likely increase the country’s share of trade  φ𝑖  .  Secondly it 
could reduce transaction cost in carrying out trade since aid is likely to 
improve infrastructure this will make the final price of country i products to 
be cheaper. Finally it might also reduce administrative and legal cost since 
aid might strengthen both financial and civil institutions so as to increase 
access to capital and reduce the bureaucracy of obtaining business permits 
and processing exports at ports. We define all these as transaction cost τ𝑖𝑘   
and express it below in equation 7 as  
 (7.)                  𝛕𝒊𝒌 = (1+𝐭𝒊𝒌 ) 𝐛𝒊 𝐛𝒌  𝐟 (𝐈𝒊 𝐈𝒌 )𝐝𝒊𝒌    
Where τ𝑖𝑘  is the transaction cost of carrying out trade in i relative to 
exporting to k. We express b𝑖 and b𝑘  as the cost of processing exports in 
country i and k respectively. We assume that transaction cost is a linear 
function of distance between i and k therefore country specific infrastructure 
should exert a positive effect on transaction cost depending on its state. The 
factor d𝑖𝑘  is the trade distance between i and k and therefore a barrier that 
should be overcome for trade to take place this could also affect price 
significantly,  I𝑖 and I𝑘 are the quality of infrastructure in country i and k. 
This shows that aid given towards improving trade capacity is likely to 
facilitate trade in a positive manner by reducing transaction cost of trade in 
general. With this we establish that there might indeed exist, a relationship 
between trade and aid. This relationship can be expressed as the inverse 
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function between trade transaction cost and infrastructure. We can express 
trade transaction cost to reflect this by writing it as shown in equation 8. 
Where I𝑑  is each country’s domestic infrastructure and  A4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅  is aid 
channeled towards infrastructure. 
 (8.)                          𝛕𝒊𝒌 = (𝟏+𝐭𝒊𝒌 ) 𝐛𝒊   (𝐀𝟒𝑻 )  𝐛𝒌 𝐝𝒊𝒌  (𝐀𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑹  +𝐈𝑫  )𝒊   +𝐈𝒌    
Putting equation 8 into 6 the export becomes (𝟗. )                          𝐗𝒊 =  (𝛗𝒊 (𝐀𝟒𝑷𝑪))   (𝐀𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑭𝑹  +𝐈𝑫  )𝒊  𝝈         𝐏𝒊  𝝈−𝟏   ( 𝐛𝒊   (𝐀𝟒𝑻 ) ) 𝝈 ∑   𝑵𝒋=𝟏     𝐘𝒊    𝐑𝒌  𝝈−𝟏   𝐄𝒊𝒌  𝝈   
Where E𝑖𝑘  represents the total cost of trade (in exports) by country i with all 
other countries. It is assumed therefore that different types of aid depending 
on the sector it is allocated to will likely have a positive effect on exports. 
Therefore we express a change in exports with respect to trade as shown in 
equation 10 below by including different constraints to trade. 
(10.)                       𝛛𝐗𝒊    𝛛(𝐀𝟒𝑻)𝒊 = 𝛛𝐗𝒊    𝛛 𝐛𝒌   𝛛𝐛𝒊    𝛛(𝐀𝟒𝑻)𝒊   > 0  
A change in exports with respect to aid will depend on how aid given 
to boost trade will reduce cost of production within a given country (see Cali 
and Velde (2009) for further discussion on how aid can influence export 
oriented growth).  
             Relating this to the private sector, the approach of our model will 
depict how aid will affect trade within a country, which will be a 
straightforward profit-maximization problem where trade within a country 
leads to a situation where firms in the private sector are attempting to 
maximize their profits (𝜋𝑖 ).  We can express profits ( 𝜋𝑖) as the difference 
between total revenue and total cost 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑇𝑅𝑖 − 𝑇𝐶𝑖. In constructing the total 
revenue function we will for simplicity assume that firms' quantity choice 
does not impact the output price.  This will be particularly true for firms in 
the export sector as they will be selling at the world price.  The total revenue 
function for firms operating in sector i can thus be written as the price of 
output from sector i (Pi) multiplied by the output level (Xi), 𝑇𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖𝑋𝑖.  So, 
the marginal revenue is equal to the price 𝑀𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖.   In sectors of an 
economy firm costs are a function of several factors.   These include the cost 
of labor (w), the cost of capital (v), transportation costs (t), and rent seeking 
(r) . The cost of labor is the wage rate per unit of output produced. The cost 
of capital can be viewed as the typical rental price of capital but also more 
broadly as to include additional factors impacting the cost of obtaining 
capital such as access to credit. Transportation costs are a function of both 
the distance to market and more importantly the level of infrastructure.  For 
example, in many developing countries the distance in kilometers to market 
is considerably less important than the state of the roads that lead there.  Rent 
seeking represents the cost of dealing with corrupt government officials 
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imposed on firms.  So, the firms total cost function can be written as 𝑇𝐶𝑖 =
𝑓𝑖(𝑤, 𝑣, 𝑡, 𝑟)𝑋𝑖.The marginal cost (MC) can be expressed as 𝑓𝑖(𝑤, 𝑣, 𝑡, 𝑟). As 
firms increase output we can assume that eventually scarcities will occur and 
the marginal cost of production will rise.  This can occur because of the 
rising cost of labor per unit of output produced and/or because of capital 
costs per unit is rising.  Eventually, there reaches a point at which 
equilibrium occurs in firms.  This profit maximization point (𝑋𝑖∗) will 
represent the point at which  𝑀𝑅𝑖 = 𝑀𝐶𝑖 , also expressed as 𝑃𝑖 =
𝑓𝑖(𝑤, 𝑣, 𝑡, 𝑟).   
One of the goals of foreign aid (𝑎𝑖) is to improve conditions for 
private sector businesses in developing countries. There are many ways in 
which this can occur.  Foreign aid can increase education and training of 
workers, which would lower the firms labor cost per unit produced.  So,  the 
wage cost per unit produced can be expressed as a negative function of 
foreign aid, 𝑤𝑖(𝑎𝑖). Aid may also be used to subsidize equipment/technology 
purchases for firms or come in the form of credit extensions which may be 
used for capital purchases. Therefore, we can write the cost of capital as a 
negative function of foreign aid, 𝑣𝑖(𝑎𝑖) .  It is common for both multilateral 
and bilateral aid to be used for infrastructure projects (roads, harbors, 
airports, etc).  These would lower the transportation costs for firms resulting 
in the following function where transportation costs are a negative function 
of foreign aid, 𝑡𝑖(𝑎𝑖).  The flow of foreign aid into a sector may have a 
negative side effect; however, by increasing the rent seeking behavior of 
government officials since more funds flowing into a sector may result in 
corrupt officials seeking higher payout from firms.  Therefore, the costs 
imposed by rent seeking officials is modeled as a positive function of aid, 
𝑟𝑖(𝑎𝑖). With foreign aid included in the model we can rewrite the equilibrium 
condition as 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖[𝑤𝑖(𝑎𝑖),𝑣𝑖(𝑎𝑖), 𝑡𝑖(𝑎𝑖)𝑟𝑖(𝑎𝑖)]  .  
We can now examine the impact on the equilibrium condition from a 
change in foreign aid.  We will assume that foreign aid does not impact 
output prices, especially for the export driven sector. Therefore, the 
differentiation of this condition with respect to foreign aid is only a 
differentiation of the marginal cost function.  This can be expressed as 
(11.)                                   𝝏𝒇𝒊
𝝏𝒂𝒊
= 𝝏𝒇𝒊
𝝏𝒘𝒊
𝝏𝒘𝒊
𝝏𝒂𝒊
+ 𝝏𝒇𝒊
𝝏𝒗𝒊
𝝏𝒗𝒊
𝝏𝒂𝒊
+ 𝝏𝒇𝒊
𝝏𝒕𝒊
𝝏𝒕𝒊
𝝏𝒂𝒊
+ 𝝏𝒇𝒊
𝝏𝒓𝒊
𝝏𝒓𝒊
𝝏𝒂𝒊
    
first expression on the right hand side ( ∂fi
∂wi
∂wi
∂ai
≤ 0) represents foreign aid 
potentially lowering the cost of labor.  They potentially lower cost of capital 
from aid is represented as   𝜕𝑓𝑖
𝜕𝑣𝑖
𝜕𝑣𝑖
𝜕𝑎𝑖
≤ 0.  The potential reduction in transport 
costs   is shown as     𝜕𝑓𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝑎𝑖
≤ 0.   The possible   rise in rent seeking costs is 
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the last term on the right hand side which is    ∂fi
∂ri
∂ri
∂ai
≥ 0. Therefore, the 
overall impact of foreign aid is combining three potential cost reduction 
factors (w, v, and t) with one potential cost increase (r).  Whether or not the 
overall sign of   𝜕𝑓𝑖
𝜕𝑎𝑖
    is greater or less than zero will depend to a large extent 
on the quality of a country’s institutions and on how the foreign aid is 
directed.  If aid is directed towards more productive uses that lower firm' 
labor, capital and/or transport costs then this will help turn the prediction 
towards lower marginal costs.  If marginal costs of production fall for firms 
as a result of foreign aid then output in the sector will increase. In other 
words, if   ∂fi
∂ai
< 0  then  ∂Xi ∂ai > 0. We do not use the gravity trade model 
because aid is typically between the rich and least developed nations 
however we use a partial log equation to depict the effect that aid can have 
on trade in developing countries. Therefore our model asserts that exports 
will depend on a set of exogenous variables 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and aid. Our set of 
exogenous variables consists of a set of variables that affect trade. The model 
we present is the trade model below in equation 12. We extend the model to 
sectors and relate the effect of aid to sectors to total trade in a country to 
determine the effect that aid to each sector has on trade.  
 
(12.) 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
We expect our above model, to yield the following hypotheses which will be 
tested in this paper for the export sector  
Hypothesis #1.) Aid focused directly on export promotion (extensions of 
trade credit, etc) will have a positive impact on exports.  
Hypothesis #2.) The positive impact of aid on exports will be reduced if the 
country has lower institutional quality     (more corruption). 
Hypothesis #3.) Aid focused on infrastructure investments will increase 
exports.   
Hypothesis #4.) Due to conditionality, it is expected that multilateral aid will 
suffer from less rent seeking and will be directed more towards lowering 
firms’ costs as opposed to bilateral aid.  Therefore, the positive impact of aid 
on exports should be higher for multilateral aid rather than bilateral aid. 
Hypothesis #5.) Aid directed towards the agricultural and educational sector 
may or may not increase exports depending on whether the aid is promoting 
production for export or for domestic consumption.  
 
3.0 Data and Sources   
  The descriptive statistics of all data used, is presented below (see 
Table 1). We use panel data in our study. We obtain data for five African 
countries, four in sub Saharan Africa and one in North Africa (i.e. Kenya, 
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Botswana, Ghana, Cameroon and Egypt) for a period of 39 years 1970 to 
2008 although some data are missing. 
 
Dependent Variable 
  Our dependent variable is exports, we use exports as our measure of 
trade, it is the total amount of goods and services exported overseas from a 
given country in constant US dollars, it however does not capture domestic 
trade which is a major limitation. Data for exports is obtained from World 
Bank database. Logarithm of exports is taken because the data on exports is 
too noisy therefore this helps to resolve scaling issues. Exports overseas 
depicts the exporting country’s capacity to exports and its share of oversea 
trade which is often its foreign exchange earning capacity, therefore export is 
a vital measure of a country’s international trade.   
 
Description of explanatory variables 
  Data for aid, gross domestic product (GDP), Population, exchange 
rate, trade openness, government spending and inflation was also obtained 
from World Bank database. Two different measure of aid is used in this 
paper. One is effective aid (pure aid) which consist of grants and grants 
component of loans, initially constructed by Chang, Fernandez- Arias, and 
Serven (1999) and the other is official aid which we described as distorted 
and conditional in nature (distorted because donors often require recipient to 
use a sizable amount to import goods from donor countries) it also consists 
of grants and loans whose grants component is at least 25% according to 
World Bank data. This allows us to determine the difference in their 
respective impact on trade. Bilateral and multilateral aid is added up to 
obtain what we call total effective aid and total official aid respectively. 
Effective aid data was available only for a period of 1975 to 1985 and 
official aid data for the period of 1970 to 2008.  We intend to compare the 
difference of the impact of effective aid from that of official aid on trade and 
note the difference between aid without conditionality (effective aid) and aid 
with conditionality (official aid) on trade since donor often require recipient 
to purchase goods from donor countries as a condition for giving official aid, 
this could make official aid to be too stringent thereby limiting its impact on 
trade.  
 
Table-1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Log of exports 195 3.25 0.48 1.21 4.32 
Log of GDP/capita 194 13.35 0.84 11.87 15.79 
Natural Resources 195 0.6 0.49 0 3 
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Exchange Rate 195 1.15 1.92 0.0004 7.03 
Landlocked Status 195 1.8 0.4 1 2 
Economic Policy 190 -1.25 1.09 -1.80 5.22 
Institutional Quality 140 -1.67 1.24 -1.83 1.83 
Crude price 195 42.72 21.48 15.93 99.11 
Life Expectancy 195 55.04 5.11 44.63 68.41 
Health Access 140 73.33 22.62 5 99 
Inflation 190 15.05 17.4 -3.21 122.88 
Openness 195 70.24 30.56 22.25 157.63 
Torture 140 0.59 0.61 0 2 
Electoral Self Determination 140 0.99 0.73 0 2 
Freedom of movement 140 1.01 0.82 0 2 
Political Imprisonment 140 0.87 0.83 0 2 
Effective Bilateral Aid 105 2.98 2.43 0.42 15 
Effective Multilateral  Aid 105 1.41 1.37 0.11 6.4 
Total Effective Aid 105 4.39 2.98 0.77 16 
Official Multilateral Aid 195 1.62 1.64 0.03 8.28 
Total Official Aid 195 5.75 3.91 0.17 18.24 
Log of Official aid to Education 144 -6.34 1.74 -14.81 -2.99 
Log of Official aid to Agriculture 145 -6.1 1.77 -10.68 -3.46 
Log of Official Aid to Infrastructure 145 -4.76 1.3 -10.08 -2.19 
Log of Official Aid to Trade Policy 130 -6.96 1.89 -13.28 -3.23 
Log of Official aid to industry 144 -6.84 1.85 -13.41 -3.04 
School enrollment rate 183 88.94 15.64 55.15 120 
Life Expectancy in Years 195 55.04 5.11 2 68.4 
Source: Authors compilation (from WDI dataset of the World Bank and other sources) 
 
  Effective aid to sectors was not available for individual sectors, 
comparing the difference in total aid allocation allows us to know the 
difference of the impact of official aid from effective aid on trade, so as draw 
conclusion of their impact on trade. Official aid to sectors alone was used to 
determine the impact of aid to sectors on trade this will probably affect our 
results since we lack data on effective aid to sectors. Data on official aid to 
sectors was obtained from The College of William and Mary Williamsburg 
Virginia aid data base www.aiddata.org , for the period of 1980 to 2008 (29 
years) for five the sectors that we wish to consider their effect on trade, 
although some years of data are missing. The sectors are trade and business 
support services, infrastructure, education agriculture and industry. Country 
specific income was represented as GDP per capita which is the average per 
capita income of individuals in a country, exchange rate is the average dollar 
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local currency exchange rate by country this captures fluctuation in the 
global economy that are likely to affect trade since the dollar is the global 
currency used in international trade. Economic liberalization rate was 
captured using the number of phone lines, since businesses are likely to 
acquire more phone lines in a liberalized economy than in a highly regulated 
one. We use indices to capture the effect of economic policy and institutional 
quality on trade in the presence of aid. This method of construction of the 
indices is shown in next section. Economic policy is the fluctuations in 
government regulatory decisions reflected in its monetary and trade policies. 
We capture this using inflation and trade openness variables and develop a 
single index for this using principal component analysis (PCA). Investors are 
likely to consider how sound and consistent government economic policy 
have been overtime in the cause o their future investment in the private 
sector of an economy. While institutional quality is reflective of government 
attitude and behavior towards governance. We capture these using political 
variables. Institutions will also capture a whole host of factors such as 
transaction cost involved in running businesses, the cost and time in 
acquiring business permits and the quality of infrastructure which will affect 
the cost of transportation to both local and foreign markets, since access 
roads linking rural agricultural areas to ports will depend on governments 
ability to create enabling environment for trade. We obtain data on 
institutions from Brigham University political data, we create an index also 
for institutions (see next section for index construction). Foreign direct 
investment is the inflow of foreign investment to the private business sector 
in a country in constant US dollars, school enrollment was used to capture 
the level of skill available in the labor market, this was the total school  
enrollment of boys and girls between the ages of 0 to 15 years of age, 
therefore we expect that this will affect the overall quality of manpower in 
countries which could have an effect on output productivity, all variables are 
for a period of 1970 to 2008 except otherwise stated.  
 
 
4.0 Some Constraints to Trade in Africa: Constructing economic and 
institutional indices 
Business surveys such as World business environment (WBE) report 
and World development reports (WBR) of the World Bank of 1999/2000 and 
1996/1997 respectively have listed some constraints to foreign direct 
investment and trade in Africa (See Table 2). They used a sample of 413 and 
540 firms respectively in Africa in the two surveys, and respondents were 
asked to determine on a four point scale (1= no constraint and 4 = severe 
constraint) for the first survey and six point scale (1= no constraint and 6 = 
severe constraint) for the second, to depict 
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Table-2 Constraints on Trade in Africa 
WBE(1= no constraint  WBR(1= no constraint  
4= severe constraint)  6= severe constraint)  
    
Corruption 2.80 Taxes and Regulation 4.50 
Weak Infrastructure 2.75 Corruption 4.47 
Street Crime 2.70 Weak Infrastructure 4.28 
Inflation 2.67 Crime 4.25 
Financing 2.64 Inflation 4.11 
Organized Crime 2.57 Lack of Access to Finance 3.95 
Political Instability 2.43 Policy Uncertainty 3.88 
Taxes and Regulation 2.24 Cost Uncertainty 3.75 
Exchange Rate 2.15 Regulation of Foreign Trade 3.64 
Source: World Bank Business Report (2000), also used by Asiedu (2002) 
Note: The table above shows the different constraints on trade in Africa using results from 
two World Bank surveys 
 
the extent to which some factors constrained business operation in African 
countries for each of the reports. As can be seen above in Table 2, 
institutional and economic factors rank highest on the list of constraints to 
business and trade in Africa. Corruption, weak infrastructure and crime are 
the greatest institutional impediments to trade while inflation and financing 
are strong economic impediments to trade. Therefore having a good measure 
for institutional quality and economic policy as they affect trade is vital in 
determining the dynamics that affect trade in Africa. In this paper we group 
most of these constraints into institutional and economic factors and reduce 
the number of variables by creating an index which captures their effect.           
             Developing a single variable from a list of variables that have been 
identified to be relevant to our topic under study (trade) makes the discussion 
of what the effect of institution or policy is on trade to be easier. Most 
variables used to capture institutional quality are often political indicators, 
they show the direction of a country’s internal governing style and are often 
used to rate the reputation of its government and its inclination to good 
governance through its affinity for democratic values. Principal component 
analysis (PCA) allows us to create a single index for economic policy and 
institutional quality, this is a statistical technique used, to derive summary 
measures from a set of variables by capturing their variation. The difficulty 
most economists face when considering institutions is that they find 
numerous indicators for institutions and it becomes difficult to analyze 
institutions using every single one of them. The variables we use to capture 
institutional quality are country specific freedom of movement and electoral 
self determination rate. These variables depict a country’s respect for rights 
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to social assembly and right to self electoral determination. The reason for 
using these two variables is that it allows us to capture country specific 
freedom of association since this could affect trade if people are prohibited 
from doing business because of their opposition to government or 
unnecessary threats to life and property. While electoral self determination 
rate allows us to capture political stability and the presence of enabling 
environment that can promote trade.      
            Governments also find it difficult to control many economic 
indicators, however some of the economic policies that governments float 
are captured using indicators that governments try to control, and some 
examples of such policies are its monetary, trade and fiscal policies. To 
capture these three policies economist use indicators such as inflation, trade 
openness and government spending or budget surplus to measure the effect 
of these policies on growth. The difficulty arising from using such indicators 
is that if one wants to talk about economic policy as an entity it also becomes 
virtually impossible or quite cumbersome using more than one indicator to 
discuss the effect of government economic policy on the issue under focus. 
Due to this difficulty we use these three indicators (inflation, trade openness 
and government consumption spending) to develop a single index for 
economic policy. In this paper we show the index construction below. We 
create the index for institutional quality using the two variables stated above. 
They are freedom of movement (freedmove), which is the right to social 
association and electoral self determination rate (elecsd) which captures 
political stability as stated earlier. We obtain these variables from Brigham 
university data set for political indicators developed by international non-
governmental organizations.   
              Freedom of association was developed by assigning a score of 0 in 
cases where it did not exist, 1 in situations where it was interfered with and 2 
in cases where it was present. Electoral self determination rate was measured 
by assigning a score of 0 in cases where it did not exist, 1 in a case where it 
existed but there were some limitations and 2 in a case where citizens have 
ability to exercise full political and voting rights. Principal component 
analysis uses a weighted average of the underlying variables above to 
develop an index for institutional quality using the matrix of eigenvectors 
transformation allowing us to obtain an uncorrelated index from a group of 
correlated variables. The result of our scatter matrix plot using the two 
variables used for generating institutional quality is presented below in fig 1. 
Where the variables 1 and 2 are freedom of movement and electoral self 
determination rate respectively. The scatter matrix shown below show that 
electoral self determination and freedom of movement are identically 
distributed (see blue dots) and closely correlated. This might not be clear but 
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a case where variables are not correlated will be explained when developing 
the economic policy index subsequently.  
 
Fig.1 Above shows matrix plot the institutional variable 
   
Table 3 Construction of institutional quality index using eigenvectors 
 
Method of construction 
(1) 
PCA 
(2) 
PCA 
 
Variables Component 1 Component 2  
 
Electoral self Determination Rate 
 
0.7071 
 
0.7071 
 
Freedom of movement 07071 -0.7071  
Note: The above values are generated using eigenvalue transformation. We used the PCA 
command “pca elecsd freedmove”to construct the institutional quality index in Table 3 
above. The index captures the variation in the two variables allowing us to generate a single 
index by adding the individual principal component of the variables. This index obtained 
using PCA is uncorrelated with the dependent variable in our regression analysis. 
 
The results of the eigenvectors values is obtained in Table-1 above, 
(we show by hand below how this is constructed although “Stata” does it 
automatically) using the PCA command “pca elecsd freedmove”. The index 
is obtained by adding the two principal components obtained from the 
eigenvalue transformation using the two variables alternately as shown 
below. 
PC1= (0.7071* elecsd) + (0.7071* freedmove) and PC2= (0.7071* elecsd) - 
(0.7071* freedmove) where freedmove = freedom of movement and elecsd = 
electoral self determination rate. Institutional quality index is given by     
Institutional quality = PC1+PC2  Where PC1 and PC2 are principal 
components 1 and 2 obtained from our variables.The score plot is shown 
below in figure 2 for the two components to depict the variation in our new 
index, it shows that there exist sufficient variations among our variables to 
capture the effect of institutions. 
elecsd
freedmove
0
1
2
0 1 2
0
1
2
0 1 2
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Fig.2 Above show the score plots for the institutional variable 
 
An index for economic policy was also created using the three 
variables inflation, trade openness and government consumption spending 
which captures government monetary, trade and fiscal policies respectively. 
Inflation is the change in price of goods over time in US dollars, trade 
openness is the ratio of exports to imports by country and government 
consumption spending is government welfare spending in US dollars, which 
displays its fiscal discipline. The scatter matrix plot for the variables used in 
the construction of economic policy is shown below below in figure 3. The 
results of our scatter plot show that government consumption spending is not 
correlated with inflation but only openness (see comparison of the narrow 
blue scatter on the left with openness and inflation). We find that inflation 
and openness have a stronger correlation with each other. Using a set of 
uncorrelated variables could affect the quality of our index since it could 
either reduce the variation of the index or over exaggerate its variation 
making the index to have a strong negative or strong positive effect leading 
to poor conclusions as to the effect of the index in our study. Government 
consumption spending was dropped to avoid such problems and we used 
only inflation and trade openness in our index construction. Past literature 
e.g. Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly (2003) also lend credence to 
our assertion since they state that countries can experience growth or trade 
increase with poor fiscal conditions (i.e. growing budget deficit) as most 
developed countries have for decades. 
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Fig3 Above show the matrix plot for the economic policy variable 
 
  The PCA command used to produce the eigenvectors in Table-4 is 
“pca openness inflation”  
 
Table 4 Construction of Economic policy index using eigenvectors 
 
Method of construction 
(1) 
PCA 
(2) 
PCA 
Variables Component 1 Component 2 
 
Openness 
 
0.7071 
 
0.7071 
Inflation 07071 -0.7071 
Note: The above values are generated using eigenvalue transformation. Using the PCA 
below we also show we construct the economic policy index from our matrix of 
eigenvectors as follows using the command “pca openness inflation” in the table above. 
 
Economic policy index is generated from our principal component 
eigenvector table shown in Table-4 above as PC1= (0.7071*openness) + 
(0.7071*inflation) and PC2= (0.7071*openness)-(0.7071*inflation) 
Economic policy index is also obtained from summation of the principal 
components shown below as Economic policy index = PC1+PC2 where PC1 
and PC2 are our principal component, 1 and 2 respectively. The results of the 
score plots also shows the correlation between openness and inflation in 
figure 4 whereas figure 5 shows all three variables, in figure 5 we observe 
that government consumption spending affects  
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Fig4                                                     Fig5 
Note: Fig 4 and 5 show the score plots for the policy variable 
 
the spread of our score plots in such a manner as to skew our spread more in 
the positive direction (compare the spread on the vertical axis of both 
figures). This gives some more leverage as to why it was dropped. See 
Abeyasekera (2004) and Schlens (2009) for further discussion on how PCA 
produce consistent indices. 
 
5.0 Empirical Analysis 
Does Aid Attract Trade? 
  Our empirical model tries to answer, if aid promotes trade? The 
argument we present is that many middle income countries receive higher 
amounts of aid than low income countries (see USAID 2010 fast facts), this 
can be attributed to the fact that there is a higher volume of trade between 
middle income countries and developed countries who give aid. Based on 
this one might be tempted to say absolutely that it is trade alone that attracts 
aid. When one considers cases like that of Rwanda or Kenya that are 
particularly poor countries with little or no mineral resources and a low 
volume of trade but receive aid, we can state otherwise  since there exists 
little or no incentive of giving aid to such countries. One can argue from 
sound judgment based on reasons for giving aid, that aid is initially altruistic 
to poor developing countries. Past studies e.g. Easterly (2003) suggest that 
giving aid to a country can establish a close connection between two 
countries leading donor country, to search for the presence of minerals and 
other country specific endowments in recipient country, on finding a sizeable 
deposit of resource this could lead to trade between both countries giving 
leverage to the argument that aid could be initially altruistic in nature, 
causing aid to attract trade.  
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Model specification 
  Hausman specification test was run to choose between using fixed 
and random effects model for estimation.  Results accept the null hypothesis 
that the fixed effects estimator is not biased (p-values are all considerably 
lower than .01). The use of instrumental variables approach is because of the 
endogeneity of the aid variables. A Hausman-Wu test rejected the null 
hypothesis that aid was exogenous, with a p-value of 0.00.  Therefore, using 
aid as an independent variable could lead to biased results. We then used 
fixed effect method of estimation to estimate our equations. We present the 
reduced forms of our three versions of aid and trade equations below (for 
effective, official and aid to sectors). 
 
The EDA versions of these equations are    
(13a) 𝑬𝑫𝑨𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑰𝒊,𝒕 + 𝐜𝐢 + µ𝒊,𝒕 
(13b) 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑬𝑫𝑨�𝒊,𝒕 + 𝐜𝐢 + µ𝒊,𝒕 
The ODA versions of these equations are 
(14a) 𝑶𝑫𝑨𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑰𝒊,𝒕 + 𝐜𝐢 + µ𝒊,𝒕 
(14b) 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑶𝑫𝑨�𝒊,𝒕 + 𝐜𝐢 + µ𝒊,𝒕 
The sectoral versions of these equations are 
(15a) 𝑨𝑰𝑫𝒊,𝒕𝒋 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑰𝒊,𝒕 + 𝐜𝐢 + µ𝒊,𝒕 
(15b) 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝑰𝑫𝒊,𝒕𝒋 +� 𝒄𝒊 + µ𝒊,𝒕 
   
  The trade (exports) equations are linear specifications, where i is the 
index for the countries, t the index for time and trade is the logarithm of per 
capita export resulting from trade with other countries, aid (be it EDA,ODA 
and aid to sectors) is expressed as the logarithm of aggregate aid allocated 
for purposes that can stimulate trade. Our vector of exogenous variables 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 consists of a group of specific variables that affect trade they consist of 
government economic policy, average dollar-local currency exchange rates 
which capture global shocks that affect trade, institutional quality, school 
enrollment rate and GDP per capita.  We excluded natural resources as a 
variable since we experience negative R-squared with its presence but use it 
in interacting aid.  We assume that aid is endogenous in the trade equations, 
since aid is likely to suffer from measurement problems. Therefore we 
employ an instrument 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 for aid to capture the effect of aid in our aid 
equation. The dynamics that govern the different types of aid in promoting 
trade was found to be complex and different from one another. We find that 
with some types of aid, trade was found to depend on additional factors, 
since aid was to be used in promotion of trade, for instance with effective 
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and official aid we found that such aid will likely be given to assist trade in 
the presence of reasonable foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic 
liberalization. With aid to sectors which was in fact official aid to sectors, aid 
will depend on some level of economic liberalization which allows for 
private ownership and some investment in the private sector but not 
necessarily foreign direct investment. Where ci  represents time invariant 
unobserved effects on trade and µit  represents time varying unobserved 
effects on trade. The fixed effect method will produce consistent estimate of 
the effect of aid on trade by allowing arbitrary correlation between 
unobserved time invariant effects (ci ) and explanatory variables in the trade 
equations. The consistency of the FE estimators will depend on following 
assumption (a.) The time varying unobserved effects µit are uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables across all time periods.  (b.) There is 
significant variation in aid flow over time and (c.) The assumption of strict 
exogeneity of explanatory variables is fulfilled. The assumption of strict 
exogeneity is going rules out feedback effects from aid to trade and country 
specific effects over time. 
            In some other instance we estimate variants of the trade (exports) 
equation using GLS including the variable “interact” the interaction between 
aid and policy, aid and institutional quality and aid and natural resources 
using interaction variables. The predicted value for the instrumented variable 
(sectoral aid) was then interacted with the institutional quality, economic 
policy or natural resources.  The second equation (with exports as the 
dependent variable) then included the predicted aid variable, one of the 
interaction variables and the other explanatory variables used in all 
regressions. 
 
The interaction versions of these equations are 
(16a) 𝑨𝑰𝑫𝒊,𝒕𝒋 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑰𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒗𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
(16b) 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝑰𝑫𝒊,𝒕𝒋� + 𝜷𝟑𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒗𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
  In all government economic policy and income were lagged by one 
period. We have a total of two right hand side endogenous variables 
(logarithm of trade and aggregate aid) and at least 6 excluded exogenous 
variables (logarithm of income, government economic policy, and 
institutional quality, exchange rates, market access, foreign direct 
investment, economic liberalization rate and school enrollment rate) with 
three interaction variables (aid interacts with economic policy, institutional 
quality and natural resources).     
 
Instrument 
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  Exclusion restriction assumptions are typically theoretical an 
instrument that is valid should therefore be correlated with aid in our model 
specification but not with trade (exports). One of the most important aspects 
of the instrumental variable approach is having a variable (or variables) in 
the aid equation which is not included in the trade (export) equation; these 
variables are referred to as the “instruments”. We expect that our instruments 
should fulfill certain conditions in our case which will be particular for 
exports.  First, instruments should have a significant impact on the variable 
they are predicting, in this case the aid variable.  The second condition is that 
the instrument should not have an impact on the dependent variable, exports 
in the second equation.  While often this is tested empirically, Wooldridge 
(2010) and others have pointed out that this also needs to be done on the 
theoretical level as testing the impact of the instrument on the dependent 
variable in the second equation (exports) with a full model could be biased as 
the instrumental correction has not been made for the endogenous variable 
(aid). We use one instrument “life expectancy” for aid (i.e. for bilateral, 
multilateral and aid to sectors for the three sets of equations), so our model is 
exactly identified, we expect aid to flow to areas with low  life expectancy, 
making life expectancy to be positively correlated with aid. Our exclusion 
restriction will hold since it is reasonable to state that on the long run low life 
expectancy will attract foreign aid but will not promote exports allowing us 
to solve our first stage and second stage equations simultaneously.  
  The exclusion restriction we impose on our trade equation is that life 
expectancy is correlated with aid but not with trade, this will hold 
econometrically, if the coefficient for aid in our structural equation after 
imposing the restriction in our trade equation (where we use life expectancy 
as a proxy for aid) tends to that in our reduced form equation and secondly, if 
the correlation between the instrument 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 and the error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is 
identically equal to zero as shown below in equation 17.  
(17)  E|𝑰𝒊,𝒕 .𝒖𝒊|=0 and E|𝑰𝒊,𝒕 . 𝝐𝒊|=0 
This then shows that the only way life expectancy is related with trade is 
only through aid therefore the instruments 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is not correlated with the 
disturbances ( 𝑢𝑖 and  𝜖𝑖 ) in our model specification and finally, if the 
exogenous component of the instrument, (the fitted value of aid) is 
uncorrelated with the error term we can therefore identify the variation of the 
dependent variable trade (exports) as the slope of the aid coefficient.  This 
shows that there is sufficient variation (which is non zero) between aid and 
our instrument which we represent in the covariance (cov) equation 18 
below. 
(18) Cov (𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊,𝒕 . 𝑰𝒊,𝒕) ≠ 0  
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(where Aid can be EDA or ODA, this means that 𝛼2 in not zero). This 
implies that exports will vary according to changes in aid in flow to countries 
(see Kraay (2008) for further discussion on exclusion restriction). We argue 
that our instrument meet the criteria theoretically for our exclusion restriction 
to hold, since the behavior of the instrument life expectancy (see the first 
stage results and F-tests in Tables 5 to 7), support previous literature e.g. 
Heintz (2004) that argue that a good instrument should capture the variation 
in the dependent variable and be highly correlated with the endogenous 
variable therefore 𝛽2 (our aid coefficient) will no longer biased in our model 
specification. 
 
Table 5. First Stage: EDA Regressions 
Method of Estimation 
 
OLS 
Bilateral EDA 
 
OLS 
Multilateral EDA 
 
OLS 
Total EDA 
Life Expectancy 0.36 
 
0.35 
 
0.71 
 
(.12)*** 
 
(.11)*** 
 
(.20)*** 
      Policy Index -0.06 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.30 
 
(.12) 
 
(.15) 
 
(.23) 
      Institution Index -0.0004 
 
-0.31 
 
-0.04 
 
(0.35) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.34) 
      Exchange Rate (LCU per $) 0.27 
 
0.23 
 
0.49 
 
(.26) 
 
(.11)** 
 
(.30) 
      FDI -0.06 
 
-0.06 
 
-3.08 
 
(.89) 
 
(.06) 
 
(.10)** 
      School Enrollment Rate 0.01 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.11 
 
(.07) 
 
(.03) 
 
(.08) 
      Liberation Policy -0.42 
 
0.97 
 
1.38 
 
(.88) 
 
(.36)** 
 
(1.03) 
      GDP per capita -2.67 
 
-0.47 
 
2.07 
 
(1.39)* 
 
(.66)*** 
 
(1.67) 
F-Test 8,23 
 
10.13 
 
12.90 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 73 
 
73 
 
73 
R-Squared 22 
 
52 
 
36 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 6. First Stage: ODA Regressions 
Method of Estimation 
 
OLS 
Bilateral  EDA 
 
OLS 
Multilateral EDA 
 
OLS 
Total EDA 
Life Expectancy 0.28 
 
0.16 
 
0.44 
 
(.05)*** 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.08)*** 
      Policy Index -0.24 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.56 
 
(.15) 
 
(.15)** 
 
(.26)** 
      Institution Index 0.24 
 
-0.03 
 
0.26 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.32) 
      Exchange Rate (LCU per $) -0.42 
 
0.22 
 
-0.18 
 
(.31) 
 
(.13) 
 
(.40) 
      FDI -0.08 
 
0.03 
 
3.10 
 
(.06) 
 
(.04) 
 
(.09) 
      School Enrollment Rate 0.02 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.04 
 
(.03) 
 
(.02)*** 
 
(.04) 
      Liberation Policy -0.63 
 
-0.13 
 
-1.75 
 
(.12)*** 
 
(.07)* 
 
(1.58) 
      GDP per capita -3.95 
 
-0.56 
 
4.47 
 
(.75)*** 
 
(.39) 
 
(1.02)*** 
F-Test 37.28 
 
13.54 
 
29.52 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 131 
 
131 
 
131 
R-Squared 0.53 
 
0.34 
 
0.48 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 7. First Stage:Sectoral Aid Regressions 
     
 
Aid to 
Trade 
 
Aid to 
Infrastructure 
 
Aid to 
Agriculture 
 
Aid to 
Education   
Life Expectancy 0.23 
 
0.16 
 
0.13 
 
0.18 
 
 
(.08)*** 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.05)*** 
 
         Policy Index 0.27 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.14 
 
 
(.24) 
 
(.15) 
 
(.17) 
 
(.32) 
 
         Institution Index 0.21 
 
0.04 
 
0.37 
 
0.39 
 
 
(.24) 
 
(.13)*** 
 
(.14)*** 
 
(.20)* 
 
         Exchange Rate (LCU per $) -0.05 
 
-0.01 
 
0.30 
 
-0.23 
 
 
(.33) 
 
(.13) 
 
(.33) 
 
(.25) 
 
         School enrollment -0.02 
 
0.01 
 
-0.04 
 
0.04 
 
 
(.02) 
 
(.01)*** 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02)* 
 
Liberalization policy 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.09 
 
0.12 
 
-0.17 
 
 
(.12) 
 
(.08)** 
 
(.08) 
 
(.09)** 
 
         GDP per capita -0.78 
 
-1.25 
 
-0.03 
 
-2.40 
 
 
(.52) 
 
(.42)*** 
 
(.57) 
 
(.57)*** 
 
         F-Test 7.95 
 
18.72 
 
10.25 
 
14.24 
 Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 # of observation 132 
 
140 
 
140 
 
139 
 R-Squared 0.21 
 
0.43 
 
0.28 
 
0.25 
 Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
 
 
  
Results 
We use fixed effect regression as stated earlier, since the result of the 
Hausman test with p-value 0.00016 (we included this in our results only for 
aid to sectors results) suggest that fixed effect estimation is more appropriate 
for our model, see Baltagi (2005), Baltagi and Wu (2010) and Wooldridge 
(2010) for further discussion. We find that the factors that affect effective aid 
are quite different from those of official aid since effective aid is pure aid 
devoid of conditionality.  Time effect “year” is included to control for 
                                                          
16  This did not hold in some cases with effective and official aid 
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differences in exports from countries in years. This allows us to control, for 
production shocks and fluctuations in global demands for exports that is 
likely to affect volumes of exports. We present our result for effective aid 
and official aid below in Tables 8 to 11. We compare the results of the OLS 
estimates with those of the 2SLS. As expected the results of the standard 
errors of our 2SLS estimates are larger than those of our OLS estimates for 
aid see standard errors in Table 8 and 9 for our regressions of trade (using 
log of exports) on effective aid and other factors that affect trade. In Table 8 
the OLS estimate for bilateral and multilateral effective aid are 0.06 and 0.10 
respectively (see coefficients in table 8 Column 1 and 2) it shows that 
bilateral aid contributed 6 percentage points towards trade (with p-value 
0.037) while multilateral aid contributed 10 percentage points to trade but 
had a stronger effect (with p-value 0.023) on trade. But the estimate is quite 
different when we use 2SLS in Table 9 the result of the F-test for excluded 
instruments for the 2SLS shows that the instrument life expectancy is valid 
and highly correlated with aid (see first stage regression results for effective 
aid). The estimated aid effect on trade is now 0.15 and 0.16 (see Table 9 
Column 1 and 2) using 2SLS showing that multilateral aid contributed about 
1 percentage point more to trade (with p-value 0.03) compared to bilateral 
trade with only 15 percent (with p-value 0.07) . This showed that controlling 
for endogeneity helps solve the problem of aid measurement, through the 
instrumental correction of aid since this could lead to bias in our results.  
The results of the regression of trade on official aid are presented in 
tables 10 and 11. The result of the OLS regression with estimates for 
bilateral and multilateral official aid respectively of   0.06 and 0.05 in Table 
10 Column 1 and 2, shows that bilateral aid contributed 6 percentage points 
to trade (with p-value of 0.000), while multilateral aid contributed 5 
percentage points (with p-value of 0.052) to trade which is 1 percentage 
points less than bilateral aid contribution to trade. The results of our 2SLS 
estimates where we control for endogeneity are different from our OLS 
estimates. The result of the F-test for excluded instruments shows that our 
instrument life expectancy is valid and highly correlated with aid (see first 
stage official aid regression). The result in Table 11 Columns 1 and 2 shows 
that bilateral aid contributes 12 percentage points to trade (with p-value 
0.000) while multilateral aid contributes 21 percentage points to trade with ( 
p-value of 0.000) which is 9 percentage points more than bilateral aid 
contribution t trade. This result suggests once again that using 2SLS to 
address the issue of endogeneity is important, since aid is likely to suffer 
from measurement problems making the OLS results to be biased. Table 12 
and 13 present the estimates of the regression of trade on aid to sectors and 
factors that affect trade in sectors. The result of our OLS estimates (see Table 
12) show that aid to sectors had no effect on trade except for aid to 
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infrastructure that contributed 10 percentage points to trade (with p-value 
0.000) while aid to trade policy and business support services, agriculture 
and education contributed 2,1 and 3 percentage points to trade respectively 
and had no significant effect on trade. The results of our 2SLS are different 
from that of the OLS estimates for aid to sectors. Aid had a significant effect 
in four sectors, With aid to trade and business support services, 
infrastructure, agriculture and education contributing 15, 22, 17 and 16 
percentage points respectively to trade using 2SLS (see Table 13 Columns 1, 
2, 3 and 4 for aid estimates of 0.15, 0.22, 0.17and 0.16 respectively) 
therefore controlling for endogeneity using 2SLS was also relevant in this 
case. Aid to industry had no significant effect on trade so we left that out in 
our results. The result of our F- test show that our instrument is relevant and 
valid since it is highly correlated with aid (see first stage results using 
official aid to sectors).  Finally GLS was used in estimating our trade 
equation with the interactive variables, the three interactive variables 
aid*economic policy, aid*institutions and aid*natural resources had reduced 
effect on trade showing that these variables reduce aid effectiveness (we 
show results in the Appendix-A to C in Tables 14 to 16).Based on the above 
results we answer the hypothesis that we posed earlier as follows 
Hypothesis #1.) Aid focused directly on export promotion (extensions of 
trade credit, etc) was found to be contributing to exporting in a significant 
manner. Therefore aid channeled to sectors that could improve output 
productivity is likely to be useful in promoting trade. 
Hypothesis #2.) Institutions were probably contributing negatively to aid 
effectiveness in promoting exports. The interactive variable aid*institutions 
had a reduce effect on exporting. It is likely that institutions are weak and not 
helping in effective utilization of aid to promote trade. 
Hypothesis #3.) Aid focused on infrastructure investments was found to be 
contributing to exports in a positive manner.  It is likely that aid used in 
developing infrastructure will likely create enabling environment that can 
promote trade by way of cost reduction in the trade facilitation process.  
Hypothesis #4.) Multilateral aid was found to be contributing to exporting in 
a more significant manner than bilateral aid. It is likely that the altruistic 
nature and good policy requirement conditions associated with multilateral 
aid made it more effective in promoting trade than bilateral aid. 
Hypothesis #5.) Aid directed towards agriculture and education sector 
contributed to exporting significantly. It is likely that aid used in improving 
the level of education of the working population as well as modernizing 
methods used in cultivation was useful to improving trade. 
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Table 8. Impact of EDA on Exports 
    Method of Estimation 
 
OLS 
(1) 
 
OLS 
(2) 
 
OLS 
(3) 
Bilateral EDA 0.06 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(.03)** 
          Multilateral EDA - 
 
0.10 
 
- 
   
(.04)** 
        
Total EDA - 
 
- 
 
0.06 
(.02)*** 
            Policy Index 0.08 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 
(.05) 
 
(.05) 
 
(.05) 
      Institution Index 0.28 
 
0.30 
 
0.28 
 
(.06)*** 
 
(.06)*** 
 
(.06)*** 
      School enrollment 0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(.004)*** 
 
(.004)*** 
 
(.004)*** 
      Exchange rate (LCU per $) 0.08 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
 
(.04)* 
 
(.04)** 
 
(.04)** 
      Liberalization policy 0.09 
 
-0.29 
 
0.18 
 
(.10) 
 
(.12)** 
 
(.10)* 
      FDI 0.06 
 
0.06 
 
0.06 
 
(.02)*** 
 
(.02)** 
 
(.02)** 
      
GDP per capita 0.15 
 
0.19 
 
0.22 
 
(.10) 
 
(.10)* 
 
(.10)** 
      
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 73 
 
73 
 
73 
R-Squared 0.72 
 
0.73 
 
0.73 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 9. Impact of EDA on Exports 
    Method of Estimation 
 
2SLS 
(1) 
 
2SLS 
(2) 
 
2SLS 
(3) 
Bilateral EDA 0.15 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(.09)* 
          Multilateral EDA - 
 
0.16 
 
- 
   
(.07)** 
        
Total EDA - 
 
- 
 
0.08 
(.04)*** 
            Policy Index -0.11 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.10 
 
(.06)** 
 
(.05)* 
 
(.05)* 
      Institution Index 0.14 
 
0.15 
 
0.15 
 
(.06)** 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.05)*** 
      School enrollment -0.001 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
(.01) 
 
(.01)** 
 
(.01) 
      Exchange rate (LCU per $) 0.21 
 
0.21 
 
0.21 
 
(.11)** 
 
(.08)*** 
 
(.09)** 
      Liberalization policy -0.13 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.09 
 
(.17) 
 
(.10)** 
 
(.13)* 
      FDI 0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.001 
 
(.02)*** 
 
(.01)** 
 
(.01)** 
      
GDP per capita 0.12 
 
0.61 
 
0.38 
 
(.45) 
 
(.18)*** 
 
(.27) 
      
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 73 
 
73 
 
73 
R-Squared 0.28 
 
0.51 
 
0.64 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 10. Impact of ODA on Exports 
    Method of Estimation 
 
OLS 
(1) 
 
OLS 
(2) 
 
OLS 
(3) 
Bilateral ODA 0.06 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(.02)*** 
    
      Multilateral ODA - 
 
0.05 
 
- 
   
(.02)* 
  
      
Total ODA - 
 
- 
 
0.04 
(.01)*** 
      
      Policy Index -0.10 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.10 
 
(.04) 
 
(.05) 
 
(.04) 
      Institution Index 0.23 
 
0.25 
 
0.23 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.04)*** 
      School enrollment 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
(.003)*** 
 
(.003)*** 
 
(.003)*** 
      Exchange rate (LCU per $) -0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02) 
      Liberalization policy 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02) 
      FDI 0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
(.02)* 
 
(.02)** 
 
(.02)* 
      
GDP per capita 0.17 
 
0.12 
 
0.19 
 
(.06)*** 
 
(.06)** 
 
(.06)*** 
      Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 131 
 
131 
 
131 
R-Squared 0.64 
 
0.61 
 
0.64 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 11. Impact of ODA on Exports 
    Method of Estimation 
 
2SLS 
(1) 
 
2SLS 
(2) 
 
2SLS 
(3) 
Bilateral ODA 0.12 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(.03)*** 
    
      Multilateral ODA - 
 
0.21 
 
- 
   
(.06)*** 
  
      
Total ODA - 
 
- 
 
0.07 
(.02)*** 
      
      Policy Index -0.05 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.04 
 
(.07) 
 
(.07) 
 
(.07) 
      Institution Index 0.14 
 
0.16 
 
0.15 
 
(.05)*** 
 
(.05)*** 
 
(.05)*** 
      School enrollment -0.001 
 
0.01 
 
0.04 
 
(.001) 
 
(.004)*** 
 
(.003) 
      Exchange rate (LCU per $) -0.02 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.06 
 
(.07) 
 
(.06)* 
 
(.06) 
      Liberalization policy 0.05 
 
-0.0002 
 
0.03 
 
(.02)** 
 
(.01) 
 
(.01)* 
      FDI 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(.01) 
 
(.01)* 
 
(.01)* 
      GDP per capita 0.10 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.02 
 
(.20) 
 
(.13)* 
 
(.16) 
      Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
# of observations 131 
 
131 
 
131 
R-Squared 0.31 
 
0.36 
 
0.39 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Table 12 Impact of Sectoral Aid on Exports 
Method of Estimation OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
     
     
Aid to trade 0.2 - - - 
 (.02)    
     
Aid to infrastructure - 0.10 - - 
  (.03)***   
     
Aid to agriculture - - 0.01 - 
   (.02)  
     
Aid to Education - - - 0.03 
    (.02) 
     
     
School Enrollment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** (.03)*** 
     
Exchange rate -0.02 -0.01 0.0002 -0.01 
 (.02)*** (.02) (.02) (.02) 
     
Economic policy 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 
 (.05)** (.04)** (.05)** (.04)** 
     
Institutional quality 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.27 
 (.03)*** (.03)*** (.04)*** (.04)*** 
     
Liberalization Policy 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (.20) (.20) (.20) (.20) 
     
GDP per capita 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.08 
 (.05) (.06)*** (.06) (.05) 
     
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 118 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.60 0.53 0.69 0.69 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
  
 
 
 
 
European Journal of Contemporary Economics and Management  
May 2014 Edition Vol.1 No.1 
45 
Table 13 Impact of Sectoral Aid on Exports 
Method of Estimation 2SLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
     
     
Aid to trade 0.15 - - - 
 (.06)**    
     
Aid to infrastructure - 0.22 - - 
  (.07)***   
     
Aid to agriculture - - 0.17 - 
   (.10)**  
     
Aid to Education - - - 0.16 
    (.06)** 
     
     
School Enrollment 0.01 0.02 -0.001 0.003 
 (.004) (.004) (.01)** (.01) 
     
Exchange rate -0.12 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 
 (.06)* (.06) (.10) (.08) 
     
Economic policy -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 
 (.06)** (.06)** (.09)** (.09)** 
     
Institutional quality 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.12 
 (.06)** (.05)*** (.07) (.06)** 
     
Liberalization Policy -0.01 0.004 0.01 0.02 
 (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) 
     
GDP per capita -0.38 -0.20 -0.41 -0.04 
 (.14)*** (.15) (.15)*** (.21) 
     
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 118 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.16 0.43 0.01 0.02 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
 In this paper we investigated some questions raised during the course 
of this study. They are what component of aid is useful in promoting trade in 
developing countries? We found that aid to sectors was useful in promoting 
trade, with aid to trade policy, infrastructure, agriculture and education being 
significant in promoting trade. This is consistent with past findings by 
Morrissey et al (2004) and Velde and Cali (2009) who state that channeling 
aid to productive sectors in an economy could boost export oriented growth.  
Aid to industry had no impact on trade so we neglected it in our results. It 
was likely that finished goods from developing countries do not compete 
favorably with goods from developed countries and technology is often a 
problem in developing countries making it difficult to produce.  Effective aid 
had contributed less to exports compared to official aid. However 
multilateral aid proved more useful promoting export than bilateral aid this is 
attributable to conditions associated with multilateral aid disbursements 
which make them more effective in promoting exporting. 
 We also investigated if economic policies and institutional quality 
improves or decreases aid effectiveness in promoting trade in Africa? We 
found that economic policy and the quality of institutions in Africa generally 
weakens the effectiveness of aid in promoting trade. The interactive 
variables “aid*government economic policy” “aid*institutional quality” and 
“aid*natural resources” had a reduced effect on trade. This is consistent with 
past findings such as Burnside and Dollar (2002) and (2004) which state that 
aid will be effective in the presence of good policies and other findings by 
Sachs and Warner (1995) and Ross (2001) that suggest the presence of 
natural resources and weak institutions can affect economic development in 
developing countries. The inclusion of natural resources in our model caused 
our model to suffer from misspecification resulting in negative R-squared so 
we exclude it and used its interaction with aid in our subsequent GLS 
regression. This interactive variable aid* natural resources exerted a reduced 
effect on trade across all sectors, reducing aid effectiveness across sectors. 
Therefore diversifying the economy in many African countries should 
therefore be a strong concern to governments. 
           The policy implications of our findings is that economic policy  has a 
significant effect on aid effectiveness in Africa, therefore donors should 
continue to emphasize the need for African countries to float sound and 
consistent economic policies. Such policies could be vital in shoring up 
investor’s confidence and ensure the effective use of aid to boost capacities 
that can improve trade and stimulate export oriented growth on the long run. 
Secondly channeling aid to sectors that are likely to improve export 
capacities in developing countries could likely improve the way that aid can 
be used to drive growth in an effective manner. Aid given to trade capacities 
European Journal of Contemporary Economics and Management  
May 2014 Edition Vol.1 No.1 
47 
will likely fulfill the short term intention of giving aid to developing 
countries since it is likely to contribute to export driven growth in many 
African countries allowing for a discontinuation of aid giving policies to 
promote growth.  Over reliance on natural resources continue to remain an 
impediment to the growth of other sectors in many African economies, 
promoting diversification is likely to help prevent shocks (due to price 
fluctuation in natural resources) in many African countries that rely on 
specific natural resources for income. The reliance on these natural resources 
as a source of alternative revenue often prevents governments from 
implementing sound policies that could improve growth. Alternative revenue 
sources through for example a creation of effective taxation scheme can help 
create other sources of financing government activities thereby reducing 
overdependence on resource derived revenues. 
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Appendix A. Table 14 Trade Regressions With Aid*Economic Policy 
Interaction 
 
Method of Estimation GLS 
(1) 
GLS 
(2) 
GLS 
(3) 
GLS 
(4) 
     
Aid to trade 0.19 - - - 
 (.07)***    
Aid to Trade*Policy 0.01 
(.01)** 
- - - 
  - - - 
Aid to infrastructure - 0.16   
  (.19)***   
Aid to Infrastruc.*policy - 0.01 - - 
  (0.01)**   
Aid to agriculture - - 0.37 - 
   (.13)***  
Aid to Agriculture*policy - - 0.02 - 
   (.01)**  
Aid to Education - - - 0.64 
    (.22)*** 
Aid to Education*policy - - - 0.01 
    (.01)** 
Aid to industry - - - - 
     
Aid to Industry*policy - - - - 
School Enrollment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** 
Exchange rate 0.07 0.02 0.22 0.01 
 (.02)*** (.02) (0.14) (0.02) 
Institutional quality 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 
 (.04)*** (.04)*** (.04)*** (.04)*** 
Liberalization rate -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** 
GDP per capita 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 (.05) (.05)** (.05) (.05) 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 131 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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 Appendix B. Table 15 Trade Regressions With Aid*Institutions Interaction 
Method of Estimation GLS 
(1) 
GLS 
(2) 
GLS 
(3) 
GLS 
(4) 
     
     
Aid to trade 0.22 - - - 
 (.07)***    
Aid to Trade*Institutions -0.04 
(.01)*** 
- - - 
   - - 
Aid to infrastructure - 0.84   
  (.28)***   
Aid to Infrastr.*Institutions - -0.06 - - 
  (0.01)***   
Aid to agriculture - - 0.40 - 
   (.13)***  
Aid to Agric*Institutions - - -0.04 - 
   (.01)***  
Aid to Education - - - 0.67 
    (.22)*** 
Aid to Educ*Institutions - - - -0.04 
    (.01)** 
Aid to industry - - - - 
     
Aid to Industry*Institutions - - - - 
     
     
School Enrollment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** (.003)*** 
     
Exchange rate 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
     
Liberalization rate -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** 
     
GDP per capita 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 (.05) (.05)** (.05) (.05) 
     
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 131 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
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Appendix C. Table 16 Trade Regressions With Aid*Natural Resources 
Interaction 
Method of Estimation GLS 
(1) 
GLS 
(2) 
GLS 
(3) 
GLS 
(4) 
Aid to trade 0.22 - - - 
 (.10)***    
Aid to Trade*Resource 0.0004 
(.0004) 
- - - 
     
Aid to infrastructure - 0.89 - - 
  (.40)***   
Aid to Infrastr.* Resource - 0.0001 - - 
  (.001)   
Aid to agriculture - - 0.42 - 
   (.19)***  
Aid to Agric.* Resource - - 0.0004 - 
   (.0005)  
Aid to Education - - - 0.71 
    (.32)*** 
Aid to Educ.* Resource    0.0004 
 - - - (.0005)** 
Aid to industry     
     
Aid to Industry* Resource - - - - 
School Enrollment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (.004)** (.004)** (.004)** (.004)** 
     
Exchange rate 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (.03)*** (.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
Institutional quality 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
 (.04)*** (.05)*** (.05)*** (.05)*** 
     
Liberalization rate -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** (.03)*** 
     
GDP per capita 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
 (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) 
     
Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of observations 131 131 131 131 
R-Squared 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  First stage results in Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
